Materiality, Morality and Masculinities in the Social Transformations of War in Angola by Spall, John & Abranches, Maria

















8 Abstract: In this paper we use men’s changing investments in desired material objects 
9 
10 as a window into the changing moralities underpinning masculinities in the wake of Angola’s 
11 
12 
civil war. Drawing on participant observation and life history interviews with middle-aged men 
13 
14 
15 working in informal commerce in the city of Huambo, we examine the roles of land, houses, 
16 
17 and cars in the construction of different styles of masculinity. We argue that analyzing 
18 
19 differences among men’s investments in these objects provides useful insights into how men 
20 
21 
construct multi-referential masculinities in a contested post-colonial, post-war context in which 
23 
24 questions of gendered cultural hegemony are contentious and complex. These masculinities 
25 
26 map onto competing, yet overlapping, sets of moral values that rework pre-existing gendered 
27 
28 
cultural forms and practices to cope with the social and economic consequences of the war and 
30 
31 to express aspirations for disparate modernities. 
32 
33 In this paper we seek to understand how the socioeconomic effects indirectly associated 
34 
35 
with a long civil war in Angola affected masculinities. Most work on masculinities and war 
36 
37 
38 examines violence or militarization, and typically focuses on men as soldiers and veterans. In 
39 
40 contrast, we are interested in discerning the gendered social transformation that the civil war in 
41 
42 Angola constituted for a generation of men in the Central Highlands, viewed over a longer time 
43 
44 
period than studies of masculinities and war generally adopt. Specifically, we show that men’s 
46 
47 investment choices reveal different styles of masculinity, each of which represents an approach 
48 
49 to coping with the gendered dilemmas generated by the civil war. 
50 
51 
The civil war in Angola began immediately upon independence in 1975, although 
53 
54 hostilities between competing independence movements dated to the independence war (1961- 
55 
56 1974). The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), who took control of the 
57 
58 
old colonial state soon after independence, was arrayed against the insurgent National Union 
59 
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3 for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).1  Cuba and the Soviet Union supported the 
4 
5 
MPLA during the Cold War, whilst apartheid South Africa and the United States supported 
7 
8 UNITA.  Both  armies  enacted  large-scale,  compulsory  male  conscription  and   intentional 
9 
10 destruction of infrastructure, industry and agriculture, and the country rapidly urbanized as 
11 
12 
civilians fled the fighting in the countryside. The war lasted for 27 years, ending with an MPLA 
13 
14 
15 military victory in 2002. 
16 
17 During the war, the oil sector rose as the most important economic motor, with 
18 
19 important implications for the Angolan labor market and hence, masculinity. As James 
20 
21 
Ferguson has argued, the oil sector in Angola is the archetype of a “socially thin” (2006, p. 36 
23 
24 and pp. 198-202) neoliberal extractive industry, whose revenues bring few direct benefits to the 
25 
26 general population, aside from regeneration of infrastructure. The President largely controlled 
27 
28 
its revenues through the national oil company, Sonangol (Soares de Oliveira, 2015). Whilst the 
30 
31 country’s economy was devastated, the war became increasingly costly. The indebted socialist 
32 
33 government began a “leveraged liberalization” (de Grassi & Ovadia, 2017, p. 119) in the late 
34 
35 
1980s, reluctantly and under pressure from international creditors, with currency devaluation, 
36 
37 
38 price liberalization, trade liberalization and privatizations primarily benefitting the MPLA 
39 
40 party-state elite. This series of processes severely limited men’s options of livelihood during 
41 
42 and after the war. 
43 
44 
Following the war, many members of Angola’s elite developed an ostentatious style of 
46 
47 masculine consumption, which the broader population has both resented and emulated (Soares 
48 
49 de Oliveira, 2015). As Soares de Oliveira has found, much of this elite projects an image of 
50 
51 
globalized entrepreneurship, enriching themselves even as many simply subcontract to foreign 
53 
54 firms. Nevertheless, the archetype of the self-made (masculine) entrepreneur has become 
55 
56 
57    
58 1 The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) was also involved at the beginning of the war, but was 
59 rapidly defeated as a military force. 
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3 powerful. In contrast, displacement from rural birthplaces during the war and resettlement in 
4 
5 
informal urban housing shaped the masculinities of the middle-aged men working in informal 
7 
8 commerce with whom we worked during this research. Wartime destruction of colonial-era 
9 
10 infrastructure, and its subsequent rapid, oil-fueled regeneration, compounded this experience. 
11 
12 
During the war they, alongside many in the region, were forced to improvise meagre livelihoods 
13 
14 
15 in the informal sector, increasingly paired with agriculture after the end of the war. The contrast 
16 
17 between Angola’s party-elite masculinity of conspicuous consumption and the options 
18 
19 available to most men was striking, and they felt it deeply. 
20 
21 
In response to this tension, the men in this study performed a number of different, 
23 
24 overlapping, multi-referential, and often morally contentious masculinities (Aboim, 2009). In 
25 
26 particular, they each had to manage pressures for reciprocity from broader kin groups, the 
27 
28 
rewards and demands of the male breadwinner ideal, and the changing social role of cash and 
30 
31 commodities undermining older gendered hierarchies and claims to modernity. To analyze how 
32 
33 men sought to manage these tensions we examine three commodities in which they invested 
34 
35 
economically, socially, and in terms of embodied style and identity: land, houses, and cars. We 
36 
37 
38 identify two signature styles from the “full house” of styles (Gould 1996, cited in Ferguson, 
39 
40 1999, p. 20), which reveal some of the gendered social fissures the war produced: the modern, 
41 
42 churchgoing, man in a companionate marriage; and the playful, consumerist, heavy-drinking 
43 
44 
womanizer. To understand how masculinities changed during the war beyond violence and 
46 
47 militarization, we use Stephen Lubkemann’s idea that wars produce new “conditions of 
48 
49 sociation” (2008, p. 216) out of what has gone before. War is not just socially destructive, he 
50 
51 
argues, rather, it severs some relations, reinforces others, and allows new connections to be 
53 
54 made, changing both the possibilities and consequences of interactions. Men pursue masculine 
55 
56 life projects in this transforming environment, informed both by pre-war cultural scripts and by 
57 
58 
their changing circumstances. 
59 
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3 James Ferguson (1999) thinks about such life projects in terms of embodied cultural 
4 
5 
styles, and we draw on his argument about the micropolitical economic and stylistic aspects of 
7 
8 embodied practice. They require the maintenance of economic relations with significant others, 
9 
10 such as deference to and patronage of elders. Yet they also incorporate stylistic elements that 
11 
12 
signal particular social allegiances – Ferguson examines a deferential traditionalist cultural 
13 
14 
15 style associated with allegiances to rural relations, and a flamboyantly cosmopolitan style. 
16 
17 These styles of masculinity require investments over time, both to master their embodied 
18 
19 aspects and to build up allegiances – they cannot be improvised. We draw on this idea of 
20 
21 
investment, which in a complex and contested post-war setting reveals the “center of gravity” 
23 





We particularly focus on commodities when examining these investments. Material 
30 
31 objects are central to how men perform masculine styles and produce themselves as particular 
32 
33 types of men. Different objects and their uses lend themselves to different relationships, and 
34 
35 
thus help organize relationships between people. For example, as Christine Jeske found in 
36 
37 
38 neoliberal South Africa (2016), many men in KwaZulu-Natal began to invest in cars rather than 
39 
40 cattle partly to strategically hedge their obligations to kin, because cattle can be transferred to 
41 
42 or shared with kin, whereas a car cannot. A focus on commodities also links our analysis of the 
43 
44 
micro-political economy of masculinity with the macro-political economy of post-war Angola. 
46 
47 As Timothy Burke (1996) argues, the meanings of goods, their social power to shape relations 
48 
49 between people, and perceptions of need for particular commodities are part of historically 
50 
51 
constituted discourses of power that are related to the domination of capitalism. Large-scale 
53 
54 legacies of colonialism, mission Christianity, historical dynamics of capitalism in the region, 
55 
56 and recent dynamics of extractive capitalism shaped men’s perception and use of goods in 
57 
58 
Huambo. Burke argues that goods form part of the common sense of hegemony in Gramscian 
59 
60 












3 terms, as part of an unspoken social context. However, in post-war contexts that have undergone 
4 
5 
rapid and divisive social transformations, it is often unclear which social forces will wield the 
7 
8 “epistemic power” (Lubkemann, 2008, p. 317) to produce cultural hegemony. It may be true in 
9 
10 many settings that “objects make people” (Miller, 2010, p. 155) through non-verbal interaction 
11 
12 
with particular “systems of things” (p.156). However, as the conditions of sociation shift during 
13 
14 




19 Examining how men take up and invest in commodities thus provides a window into 
20 
21 
how a gendered social order transforms in the wake of war, and into the key fissures and 
23 
24 conflicts produced as macro and micro powers intersect. As Bianca Murillo (2017) has argued, 
25 
26 it is important to take account of how relations of domination and the interests of others shape 
27 
28 
African cultures and politics of consumption, but also how the latter are products of Africans’ 
30 
31 own agency, agendas, and social relations. We have chosen to focus on land, houses, and cars 
32 
33 in this article, because they were the focus of particular discussion, desire, and moral 
34 
35 
judgement. They also required significant, long-term investments, signaling quite clear 
36 
37 
38 differences in masculine life projects, which were linked to particular social and cultural 
39 
40 allegiances. In addition, the spatial dynamics of the Angolan civil war and its aftermath affected 
41 
42 them all in ways that were central to the tensions these men faced. 
43 
44 
In the next section of this article, we briefly outline our methodology. In the following 
46 
47 three sections we discuss the three key commodities in turn: land, housing, and automobiles. 
48 
49 We analyze how each was strategically taken up in different styles of masculine life project and 
50 
51 
how these uses related to moral contests around the changing contours of post-war 
53 
54 masculinities. We conclude by discussing the multi-referential, overlapping, and contested 
55 

















3 (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005) helps us to understand the nature of masculine dominance 
4 
5 







Our focus in this article is on a group of men living in the suburbs of Huambo, Angola’s 
13 
14 
15 second city, which in 2014 had a population of 665,574 (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 
16 
17 2014). Huambo is located in Angola’s central highlands, its most populous rural region. Most 
18 
19 of our participants fought for the MPLA government’s army in the late 1970s or 1980s. At the 
20 
21 
time of research, they were aged late 30s to mid-50s and were engaged in precarious informal 
23 
24 work, earning enough to support the basic needs of their households but little more. The men 
25 
26 worked selling non-food goods in city markets, as motorbike taxi drivers, and as informal 
27 
28 
money changers. Most supplemented this income with subsistence agriculture. 
30 
31 Our arguments are based on ethnographic data from 2012 with around 40 men, and on 
32 
33 a return visit in 2015, when we accompanied four of these men to visit and interview their 
34 
35 
broader kin groups in their rural home villages (kimbos). We first met these men in and around 
36 
37 
38 the markets where they worked, which were freely accessible to us as foreigners and strangers, 
39 
40 and where they had significant amounts of free time in which to welcome us. We gradually 
41 
42 began socializing with them several times a week in their workplaces and also in their 
43 
44 
neighborhoods, at football matches and in their churches. We selected four groups of market 
46 
47 traders to work with and included increasing numbers of men as we became more integrated 
48 
49 into their social networks. We selected two groups from a city-center market, and two from a 
50 
51 
market in the suburbs, mainly because of the importance of different city neighborhoods for 
53 
54 identity and social prestige. Towards the end of the first period of research we carried out life 
55 
56 history interviews with around half of them, since we were interested in the impact of the war 
57 
58 
on the whole life courses of men. 
59 
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3 We also interviewed and conducted participant observation with younger men in the 
4 
5 
markets, with UNITA veterans and middle-class men, to discover how the cohort of men we 
7 
8 were most focused on was viewed from other subject positions. In addition, we interviewed key 
9 
10 informants such as faith leaders, local agricultural and veterans’ affairs government officials, 
11 
12 
and NGO staff, who were particularly knowledgeable about the kind of men we were most 
13 
14 
15 interested in. We were careful in our research not to raise issues that could prove traumatic for 
16 
17 these men, particularly in terms of their experience of violence during the war. We also use 
18 
19 pseudonyms for all of the men quoted in this article, due to the potential dangers of political 
20 
21 
dissent in Angola. All of the men were aware of the uses that the data was to be put to, and were 
23 
24 glad to have the chance to tell their stories in order to counter what they saw as the distortions 
25 





31 Land, Gerontocracy and Intertwined Urban and Rural Visions 
32 
33 We will discuss two main styles of masculine life project in this article. Most 
34 
35 
prominently we will discuss that of churchgoing men who maintained some links to their rural 
36 
37 
38 kin, but most of whom were keen to maintain their urban residence and build a life as a wise 
39 
40 and respectable elder man supporting a monogamous conjugal household. We contrast this 
41 
42 group in subsequent sections with those whose masculinities were more oriented to displaying 
43 
44 
symbols of monetary wealth, womanizing, and generally being willing to publicly rebel against 
46 
47 norms of dignified male behavior that the churchgoing men advocated. 
48 
49 Most of our participants subsisted partly on the products of their family’s land. The 
50 
51 
majority of these men’s families had fled the countryside during the war, and day-to-day 
53 
54 survival in towns and cities relied largely on the cash economy and limited subsistence 
55 
56 agriculture. They purchased goods brought by armored government convoy, since 
57 
58 
unaccompanied travel risked attack by UNITA forces. Despite these dangers, their elder 
59 
60 












3 relatives made risky returns to their land during the war, to harvest produce and to safeguard 
4 
5 
against competing land claims. After the war, however, access to the land became possible 
7 
8 again. Many men spoke of this access as one of the key benefits of peace – now, even if they 
9 
10 failed to profit in their informal businesses, they would not starve. Their reliance on the land 
11 
12 
meant maintaining relationships with rural kin, of varying degrees of closeness. João (42), for 
13 
14 
15 instance, was not directly involved in agriculture in his relatively remote home village of 
16 
17 Cassongue, about 160 km from Huambo. However, he sent his family cash contributions; in 
18 
19 return, they sent produce grown on their land. 
20 
21 
Exercising control over his eldest son was a key part of João’s father’s masculine life 
23 
24 project, but João was keen to maintain his autonomy: upon leaving the army, he had resolved 
25 
26 that it was undignified for a man of his age to take orders from anyone. This resolution 
27 
28 
discouraged long-term investment in land as a commodity around which to orient his life. João’s 
30 
31 elderly father complained that younger generations did not value or maintain the family’s land. 
32 
33 This was a constant refrain in the villages that we visited, and in interviews with staff of rural 
34 
35 
development institutions. Young people were said to lack the patience to watch crops grow, 
36 
37 
38 craving more immediate success. João’s father was the soba (village headman) in Cassongue, 
39 
40 and João nodded when his father spoke of João’s eventual return to the village to succeed him 
41 
42 as soba. However, as soon as we got into the car to return to Huambo, João confided, “I’m 
43 
44 
never coming back here.” He explained that making a living from the land was too hard and 
46 
47 that his life would be in danger from sorcery attacks by those envious of his relative success in 
48 
49 the city.2 In addition, in these areas land is inherited through the male line and controlled by 
50 
51 





57    
58 2 Fears of sorcery attacks due to comparative success are often mentioned in the historical literature on this part of 
59 Angola in the 20th century (Edwards, 1962; Heywood, 2000; Pössinger, 1973). 
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3 Nando (40) maintained a closer relationship to the land. He was preparing to retire to 
4 
5 
his kimbo, Honde, about 130km from Huambo and difficult to access by car. After years of 
7 
8 supporting his younger siblings’ education, he felt he could not afford to retire in the city; 
9 
10 instead, he was investing in cattle to support his retirement. He supported his kin despite the 
11 
12 
remoteness of his village, including by bringing them a large water tank from Huambo via 
13 
14 
15 motorbike. On our visit to the village, he showed pride in his popularity, noting that his presence 
16 
17 and conversation were in demand to the point of a responsibility to eat a maize meal with each 
18 
19 family to avoid complaints. Unlike his humbler persona in the city, where his opinions were 
20 
21 
often contradicted by colleagues, in the village he was confident and gregarious, keen to show 
23 
24 us his social connections. The situational nature of his status illustrates a marked difference 
25 
26 between masculine styles cultivated with a view to retirement in the kimbo and those cultivated 
27 
28 
for city residence: whereas the latter commanded respect in both city and kimbo, the former 
30 
31 tended to command respect only in the kimbo. Nando had inherited his land in the village from 
32 
33 his father, who died when Nando was young. Thus, investing in land did not require deference 
34 
35 
to his father; he both accrued masculine respect in his village and solved some of his economic 
36 
37 
38 problems. Doing so required building up his social ties in the village to facilitate his good 
39 
40 reception there upon his retirement, including maintaining respect for masculine norms that 
41 
42 were respected in his village and fulfilling his obligations for reciprocity. 
43 
44 
A pronounced ambivalence about family lands, and the masculine cultural styles they 
46 
47 might support, lies under the various roles land plays in men’s life projects. All our participants 
48 
49 – even those planning to retire to their kimbo – represented rural living as backward and 
50 
51 
undeveloped. As Nando explained, “most people who live in the countryside are burros (stupid, 
53 




















3 example of their own living.3 This discourse echoes through what Jon Schubert (2015) calls the 
4 
5 
discourse of the “New Angola” promoted by the ruling MPLA elite, massively enriched by the 
7 
8 country’s oil wealth. This view disparages the rural hinterland of Angola and the speaking of 
9 
10 African languages. True “Angolan-ness” is associated with the coastal cities, the speaking of 
11 
12 
Portuguese, and monetary riches. This vision is an influential aspiration (Soares de Oliveira, 
14 
15 2015); many see it as a model of social mobility to emulate. 
16 
17 A different representation of the kimbo and the land stands against the “New Angola” 
18 
19 
vision. Our participants felt anxiety about the social role of money, including its threat to ethics 
21 
22 of sharing and respect, male gerontocracies, and the idealized life course. As in many settings 
23 
24 in Africa, age hierarchies in Huambo are important in organizing gender relations. The male 
25 
26 life unfolds via transitions among life stages, such as initiation rituals, marriage, and transition 
27 
28 
to eldership. The gradual lifetime accumulation of wisdom both shapes and is considered to 
30 
31 morally justify these transitions. 
32 
33 Our participants considered that the extreme wealth of the MPLA elite produced a 
34 
35 
dangerous greed in Angolans, discouraging many people, especially the young, from the hard 
37 
38 work and patience necessary to gain social advancement over time. The kimbo’s association 
39 
40 with an ancestral past paradoxically gave it moral legitimacy, suggesting a different and more 
41 
42 
moral future guided by wise male elders, with respect for intrinsic human worth and the 
44 
45 gendered age hierarchy, rather than for wealth. 
46 
47 Crucially, these qualities seemed to be embodied in the land itself. The land, for many, 
48 




53    
54 
3 These views may be partly self-justifying, given that they were not shared by those men who had chosen to settle 
55 
in the kimbo. However, that even Nando was ambivalent, despite investing in his village and planning to retire 
56 
there, suggests that this view may be more broadly shared. 
57 
4 It is important to note here that land ownership in the region had already been disrupted by processes of 
58 
commoditisation in the colonial period and was far from stable (see Pössinger, 1973; and Heywood, 2000). 
59 
Pressure from colonial land grabs for settlers, land becoming private property, the growth of cash cropping and 
60 












3 not refer to the kimbo or the countryside, but to the terra – land – to represent both. Many city- 
4 
5 
dwelling men we spoke with expressed anxiety about the imported food that had grown in 
7 
8 importance since the end of the war. In a typical exchange, Paulo (37) asked whether we ate 
9 
10 the frozen chickens sold in Huambo supermarkets. He suggested that we should be afraid of the 
11 
12 
antibiotics used to conserve them, and that “even mineral water has chemicals in it that are bad 
13 
14 
15 for you, and you can feel pain in your kidneys if you drink too much of it.” Jamba (49) said that 
16 
17 farmers had forgotten that they were growing food to feed their fellow men, and instead used 
18 
19 dangerous chemicals to increase their yields and make more money – poisoning their fellow 
20 
21 
men in the process. 
23 
24 Conversely, the men saw food from ancestral lands and the idealized rural society more 
25 
26 generally as free of the symbolic and corporeal corruptions of money. It was valued by all, 
27 
28 
including those who managed to grow it without maintaining other dependency relationships 
30 
31 with the land of origin. As Paulo told us: 
32 
33 “In the kimbos they only eat what they grow there, and it’s all natural, they eat worse, 
34 
35 
but their health is better, they live longer. People here [in the city] just fall down one day and 
36 
37 
38 they find out that it was hypertension, or people get diabetes from eating too much sugar.” 
39 
40 Investments in land, then, held a complex and ambivalent set of meanings for these 
41 
42 men’s masculinities. Most wanted to evade the submission to elders’ authority required by a 
43 
44 
strong material investment in the land, and the implications of backwardness and failure implied 
46 
47 in rural residence. Yet the land remained an important repository for the symbols and values 
48 
49 underpinning their preferred masculine life course, based on the gradual accumulation of 
50 
51 





57    
58 the breakdown of broader kin groups into smaller family units were just some of the factors producing rapid change 
59 before the civil war. 
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3 they saw as threatening both their status and respect, and the moral and physical health of 
4 
5 




10 Houses: Breadwinner Struggles and Respectable Urban Masculinity 
11 
12 
Whereas these men kept the land somewhat at arm’s length, houses were much more 
13 
14 
15 central to how senior masculinities were constructed in the city. They were a key site where the 
16 
17 breadwinner ideal was performed, a tool for performing the ideal and for managing potentially 
18 
19 problematic conjugal relations stemming from tensions around breadwinning. Houses were also 
20 
21 
key demonstrations of social status and modernity, or exclusion and backwardness, and a means 
23 
24 to challenge such exclusions. Our participants emphasized two principal events after leaving 
25 
26 the army: finding a house in the city and establishing a household. Although none of them were 
27 
28 
married when they entered the army, most married shortly after leaving. A “successful” 
30 
31 marriage required purchasing (not renting) a house, and having children quickly. They had 
32 
33 entered the army as adolescents but wanted to arrive in civilian society as men, and a house was 
34 
35 
a non-negotiable part of achieving adult manhood.5 
37 
38 Investing in houses implied investment in particular sets of relationships: in the 
39 
40 breadwinner ideal, a particularly important aspect of masculinity, men are the main providers 
41 
42 
for a household that includes children, and sometimes nieces or nephews or an elderly parent. 
44 
45 As in the “classic” breadwinner model, there was, in discourse at least, an implied balance of 
46 
47 responsibilities and rights. The husband ensured that household members were fed, clothed, 
48 
49 and educated. In return, other household members – meaning women and junior men – 
50 
51 




56    
57 5 This requirement has a longer history. As two anthropologists working in the early and mid-twentieth century 
58 
noted (Childs, 1949; Edwards, 1962), adolescent boys leave their parental home after puberty, and build their own 
59 
hut, in which their future wife would later join them. 
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3 century Yorubaland (2003), there were private and public aspects to breadwinning. It was 
4 
5 
important for men’s authority in the household and their sense of themselves as successful and 
7 
8 modern, and it was also important in earning their peers’ respect. More broadly, it shaped their 
9 






15 In practice, there were complex gendered struggles for ascendancy both within and 
16 
17 beyond the household, and men often felt that their position as head of the household was 
18 
19 threatened. These struggles involved a distinction between one’s duties “in the house” and those 
20 
21 
“out of the house.” One line of tension was between loyalties to the conjugal household and to 
23 
24 matrilineal kin outside the house. In matrilineal descent systems, property and statuses are 
25 
26 inherited by a man’s sister’s son, rather than by his own son. This can mean that people are 
27 
28 
keen to keep wealth within the matriliny and have primary kin loyalties beyond the conjugal 
30 
31 household to their matrikin. In Huambo in 2012, descent was contested: churches and the 
32 
33 government preferred descent running from parents to children within the nuclear family. Many 
34 
35 
people still felt important allegiances to their matriliny, however, despite its stigma as backward 
36 
37 
38 and immoral. Thus, men often muttered darkly about their wives spending money on their 
39 
40 brothers rather than on the household. Yet those same men might praise contributions to their 
41 
42 households from their own sisters. This demonstrates, as in Stephan Miescher’s work on 
43 
44 
Presbyterian masculinities in Ghana (2005), that men managed conflicting pressures by 
46 
47 adopting divergent aspects of masculinity situationally, and by making some concession to 
48 
49 contradictory pressures for reciprocity both from the matriliny and the conjugal household. 
50 
51 




56 Men also confronted a tension between spending money on their wives and children or 
57 
58 
on their girlfriends and womanizing. Men doing the latter were called mulherengos (from 
59 
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3 mulher – “woman”) and were subject to moral censure from the many men of their generation 
4 
5 
who were committed churchgoers. Their failure to spend one’s earnings “in the house” was one 
7 
8 source of this censure. This meant adopting a quite different model of masculinity, as did 
9 
10 prioritizing spending on one’s matrilineal kin. 
11 
12 
Thus, the masculinity of the responsible and respectable breadwinning man was 
13 
14 
15 constructed in the house, which acted as a symbol of social attachments and a tool for their 
16 
17 realization. Beyond houses as constellations of relationships, the location and type of 
18 
19 construction also had important symbolic overtones. Most participants lived in the bairros, or 
20 
21 
suburban and peri-urban parts of Huambo: mostly improvised neighborhoods outside the old 
23 
24 colonial center of the city (the cidade), without paved roads, sanitation, running water, or 
25 
26 electricity. The bairros had long represented an incomplete transition to modern, urban living, 
27 
28 
and maintained visible vestiges of rurality (see Roque, 2011 for a similar account in Benguela). 
30 
31 In the cidade, by contrast, there were still many Portuguese colonial brick buildings, principally 
32 
33 reserved for the ‘civilized’ – in practice, overwhelmingly white – population in the colonial 
34 
35 
period (Neto, 2012). They had paved roads, and the electricity and running water typically 
36 
37 
38 worked. The character of a neighborhood represented those who lived there, and most of these 
39 
40 men wished that their neighborhoods were more like the cidade – thinking that it suggested 
41 
42 something about their social standing and modern-ness. 
43 
44 
Another important aspect of a house, over which men had slightly more control, was 
46 
47 the material of construction. Most of these men had adobe houses, the cheapest option and the 
48 
49 only one most of them could afford. While fairly reliable, adobe often developed structural 
50 
51 
problems over time. Most would have preferred a house built from cement blocks, and some 
53 
54 were saving for one. Such a house was called a “definitive” house, inferring that adobe houses 
55 
56 were merely provisional. As David Morton argues in his study of house building in Maputo 
57 
58 
(2019), building a house out of blocks was an attempt to combat exclusion from participation 
59 
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3 in  modernity  and  to  overcome  the  stigmatizing  spatial  divisions  that  were  a  legacy  of 
4 
5 
Portuguese colonialism. Claudia Gastrow (2017), in her study in Angola’s capital city of 
7 
8 Luanda, similarly argues that building a cement block house in the suburbs constitutes a claim 
9 
10 on participation in ‘good urbanism’, seen as a prerequisite for political belonging in the city, 
11 
12 





17 José (49) was in the final stages of building an impressive “definitive” house in 2012: 
18 
19 it had two bedrooms, a large living room and a kitchen, with a veranda outside and an 
20 
21 
outbuilding with two additional bedrooms in it. Constructed from a mixture of concrete and 
23 
24 adobe blocks, the main house had sturdy metal-framed windows, and was large and solid 
25 
26 compared to its neighbors. It materialized several aspects of the breadwinner model of 
27 
28 
masculinity: his economic prowess and ability to be the household’s main breadwinner, his 
30 
31 successful caring for his family, and his having “made it” as a modern urban man. José’s house 
32 
33 also suggested something about how he tackles the tensions of marital life, and was an 
34 
35 
instrument in resolving them. In the courtyard, José had taken several weeks away from his 
36 
37 
38 market stall to dig a well 20 meters deep, lined with concrete rings. Soon, his wife and daughters 
39 
40 would no longer arise before dawn to walk to the edge of the city, descending the dangerously 
41 
42 steep riverbanks – “it was more or less a hole” – to fetch water. 
43 
44 
The well was part of José’s effort to build a relationship with his wife based on a 
46 
47 companionate idea of marriage, as advocated by the Seventh Day Adventist church he attended. 
48 
49 Many participants, in contrast, did not socialize with their wives and spoke bitterly about the 
50 
51 
threat they posed to the men’s breadwinner status: gossiping about their temporary failure to 
53 
























8 José had been a church marriage counsellor and spoke of how couples should work  as 
9 
10 a  team,  managing  their  income  together.  For  more  committed  churchgoing  men,  this 
11 
12 
represented a solution to some of the insecurities raised by the breadwinner model of 
13 
14 
15 masculinity, while allowing men to maintain, they implied, a pre-eminent position over women. 
16 
17 It also represented a particular aspirational and cosmopolitan modernity. The men often referred 
18 
19 to the global nature of their churches (Catholic, Congregationalist, or Seventh Day Adventist), 
20 
21 
and presented companionate marriage as something rational and modern, which we, as 
23 
24 Europeans, should admire. 
25 
26 Houses, then, were central to these men’s masculine life projects. They were the 
27 
28 
material setting where the ideal of the breadwinner was realized, an ideal that was important to 
30 
31 all our participants. The material and location of these houses also illuminates the legacies of 
32 
33 colonial segregation and the ongoing exclusion of most residents from employment that would 
34 
35 
allow them to create decent housing. It also demonstrates how men sought to escape these 
36 
37 
38 exclusions, how they used houses to manage conjugal relationships and defuse some of the 
39 
40 tensions inherent in the breadwinner ideal, and how they laid claim to a style of modern, 
41 
42 cosmopolitan, and morally upstanding masculinity. Diverse types and levels of investment in 
43 
44 
houses thus reveal the commitment of different men to different cultural styles of masculinity 
46 





Automobiles: Mobile Masculine Status Symbols beyond the Household 
53 
54 
55    
56 6 As Lisa Lindsay has argued (2003), there is often a disjuncture between discourse and practice in breadwinning. 
57 
The discourse often suggests that women are home-makers and men earn the lion’s share of the income. In a 
58 
household survey of veterans’ wives (Spall 2020 p.136), wives’ estimations of their own income earning 
59 
outstripped that of their husbands in 49 percent of cases. 
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3 Automobiles represent a different kind of investment compared to houses: those who 
4 
5 
can afford their own means of transport can use it to generate an income. Most people in 
7 
8 Huambo rely on public transport, since, as in much of Africa (Hart, 2016) they cannot afford 
9 
10 private cars. Many of the men with whom we worked were kupapatas (motorbike taxi drivers), 
11 
12 
a profession compatible with being the respectable head of a conjugal household. The capital 
13 
14 
15 outlay to buy a motorbike taxi,
7 moreover, could generate earnings that in turn could purchase 
16 
17 a Toyota Corolla taxi (Nando, quoted above, had made this step.) The more lucrative taxi 
18 
19 service could generate proceeds toward a Toyota Hiace minibus, which provided much of the 
20 
21 
public transport in Huambo – and in other cities in Angola (and further afield, see Mutongi, 
23 
24 2017). By investing in this series of progressively more expensive transit, therefore, men can 
25 
26 move from riding in other men’s minibuses to driving their own. 
27 
28 
Cars suggested considerable earning power and upward social mobility. One of us [John 
30 
31 Spall] spent time as a neighborhood football team photographer, taking photos of games and 
32 
33 celebrations on special occasions. At these celebrations people who did not own cars commonly 
34 
35 
asked to have their photo taken sitting in the driver’s seat of someone else’s car. Car ownership 
36 
37 
38 suggested an upward social trajectory, perhaps even towards joining Angola’s modest middle 
39 
40 class – as an entrepreneur, nurse, teacher, or government functionary – something many of these 
41 
42 men aspired to for their children, as a form of generational progress. These were careers that 
43 
44 
the deceitful and kleptocratic party-state had denied them, as they saw it. These careers 
46 
47 represented stability, education, and successful, modern urban living – and the men saw cars as 
48 
49 part of that picture. As Burke (1996) argues, the style of an affluent class may be attractive even 
50 
51 






58    
59 7 See (Lopes, 2011) for an analysis of the economics of informal public transport in Huambo. 
60 












3 Cars were very expensive in Angola at the time of our fieldwork, making them hard for 
4 
5 
our participants to acquire. No importing of used light vehicles over three years old was 
7 
8 allowed, and new cars were subject to heavy import duties. The men we worked with deeply 
9 
10 resented this situation, viewing it as an attempt to limit access to a dignified modern life to 
11 
12 
those connected to the party-state elite (see Chalfin, 2008 for a similar case of state bodies 
13 
14 
15 limiting social mobility in Ghana).
8 Nevertheless, there was no shortage of cars on the streets 
16 
17 of Huambo. Cars had important practical uses that were newly possible since the end of the war 
18 
19 and the ensuing infrastructure repair; cars were much more than simply status symbols. 
20 
21 
Nevertheless, a new four-wheel drive car with air conditioning – preferably a Toyota or a 
23 
24 Mitsubishi – was the ultimate (and ultimately masculine) success symbol for many men. 
25 
26 This achievement was out of reach for most of the men with whom we worked, though 
27 
28 
a few had second-hand four-by-fours, and one or two had elderly, unreliable hatchbacks that 
30 
31 they nursed through multiple breakdowns. Men who could not afford a car often owned 
32 
33 motorbikes, some customized with transfers and chrome accessories to suggest upward social 
34 
35 
mobility. The choice of motorbike could also gesture towards class mobility: the stylized, 
36 
37 
38 Italian-style motor-scooter was considered by some as more fashionable and prestigious, for 
39 
40 instance, than the more prosaic Indian-manufactured Triumph-style bike. 
41 
42 Investing in transportation over land or houses was clearly a personal choice as well as 
43 
44 
an economic strategy. However, just like land and houses, prioritizing investments in transport 
46 
47 over competing obligations carried negative social consequences. Our participants expressed 
48 
49 widespread disapproval of men who prioritized spending on cars rather than on their houses 
50 
51 
and households. We often heard of men investing in a car while living in an adobe house and 
53 
54 
55    
56 8 It is worth noting, however, that the original Presidential decree for this measure (number 135/10) had some 
57 
economic motivations for the import limitation: the limited foreign exchange available for spare parts, potential 
58 
damage to newly built asphalt roads, and the desire to develop a domestic car manufacturing sector. This import 
59 
limitation has more recently been slightly relaxed (in decree 161/18). 
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3 failing to properly clothe their children. (While this might have been an exaggeration, at least 
4 
5 
one man we knew had a brand-new Toyota four-by-four yet lived in an adobe house). Even in 
7 
8 similar situations, different men approached this decision differently. For instance, we worked 
9 
10 with an uncle and nephew who were equal partners in a market business. One, Flávio (42), 
11 
12 
saved up $15,000 to buy a used Toyota Rav4, whereas his uncle, Jamba (49, quoted above) 
13 
14 
15 bought a plot of land on which to build a concrete block house. 
16 
17 The contrast between the two men’s investments and its relation to their masculine 
18 
19 styles is instructive. Whereas Jamba was a committed Seventh Day Adventist, Flávio was a 
20 
21 
notorious mulherengo - his friends talked about “go[ing] on the rounds” to pick up women. 
23 
24 Cars were useful in this endeavor, as a powerful mobile status symbol that did not require the 
25 
26 sort of investment needed to buy or build a concrete block house in the cidade. They could be 
27 
28 
useful in impressing business connections but were also useful in forming casual sexual 
30 
31 attachments with women (quite a different way of asserting power over women than through 
32 
33 companionate marriage). Owning one was “a performance of success beyond the financial 
34 
35 
means of the actor in question” (Newell, 2009, p. 385), at least as viewed from the normative 
36 
37 
38 moral position that a man should prioritize investments in the household. However, this element 
39 
40 of a “bluff” (Newell, 2009, p. 379) was not necessarily visible to the women whom these men 
41 
42 sought to meet. Cars were an investment in the “performative competence” (Ferguson, 1999, 
43 
44 
p. 96) required to successfully enact the mulherengo style. 
46 
47 As has been found by scholars in Mozambique (e.g. Aboim, 2009), men who find 
48 
49 establishing a household difficult may see public performances of implied sexual prowess as 
50 
51 
powerful alternative routes to masculine respect. Impressive cars and the masculine 
53 
54 characteristics they suggested were excellent tools to achieve the sexual conquests this respect 
55 
56 required. Owning a car implied, then, a move away from investments in the land or a house, to 
57 
58 
prioritize a purchase that hedged demands for reciprocity and support. The kind of status cars 
59 
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3 gave these men was more individualized than that of land or houses, limiting demands for 
4 
5 
support not just from broader kin groups, but even from one’s own household. Cars represented 
7 
8 a status claim by the man driving, not his household. This intrinsic individuality of automobiles 
9 
10 is a reason that cars have provoked moral debates about the practice and effects of automobility 
11 
12 
(Hart, 2016). As in the case studied by Jeske in South Africa (2016), individuality did not mean 
13 
14 
15 the complete abandonment of relations of kin reciprocity and caring; rather, there was an 
16 
17 uncomfortable oscillation between the two modes. Nevertheless, the investment in cars shows 
18 





24 Investments in cars also represented a greater willingness to embrace the values of the 
25 
26 “New Angola” and a move away from the “African traditions” of the hinterland (see also Soares 
27 
28 
de Oliveira, 2015). They reflected aspirations to rapid class ascension in post-war Angola and 
30 
31 to a style of masculinity that suggested monetary wealth. The mulherengo style of masculinity 
32 
33 embraced opportunities apparently offered by the post-war Angolan economy to demonstrate 
34 
35 
upward social mobility and to emulate the (pseudo-) entrepreneurs of the party state elite. 
36 
37 
38 Paralleling how companionate marriage implied a link to global churches and moralities viewed 
39 
40 as modern and transnational, investments in cars gestured towards affluent lifestyles associated 
41 
42 with the global North, newly visible on television since the end of the war. 
43 
44 
These points should not be overstated: these men still had relatively stable households 
46 
47 and marital relationships, and not all who owned expensive cars were womanizers – car 
48 
49 ownership was much higher for those on higher incomes, including, for example, pastors. 
50 
51 
Investments in cars, however, suggested a clear difference from those who prioritized 
53 
54 investments in land or a house. Men not yet able to achieve clear upward class mobility often 
55 




















Most  of  the  men  with  whom  we  worked  invested  to  some  extent  in  all  three 
7 
8 commodities: land, houses, and automobiles. Thus, the models of masculinity we describe are 
9 
10 not mutually exclusive, but in fact overlap substantially. However, the “center of gravity” was 
11 
12 
clearly distinct for men’s investments in different objects, implying the fulfilment of different 
13 
14 
15 moral obligations to different sets of people, and appeals to different sets of social and cultural 
16 
17 allegiances beyond their immediate social setting. 
18 
19 Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity provides a useful lens through which to 
20 
21 
see these data. Connell defined hegemonic masculinity as a historically constituted “pattern of 
23 
24 practice … that allow[s] men’s dominance over women to continue” (Connell and 
25 
26 Messerschmidt, 2005 p.832). As Lindsay and Miescher have argued (2003 pp. 6-7, 21), social 
27 
28 
settings in Africa are perhaps particularly contested due to the legacies of colonialism, and as 
30 
31 we have shown in this article, that is doubly true in the case of post-colonial countries emerging 
32 
33 from civil wars. For Lindsay and Miescher, it is not always obvious in Africa which notions of 
34 
35 
masculinity are dominant, and there is a continuing interaction and transformation between 
36 
37 
38 different models of gender. They therefore urge caution in the use of the concept in work on 
39 
40 Africa. Which sorts of morality ought to orient senior men’s masculinity, including the role of 
41 
42 materiality, is vigorously contested in Huambo, with no single, coherent vision exercising 
43 
44 
dominance. Being a successful breadwinner was important for all of them, but it was subject to 
46 
47 significant, contested variation: some men had distant and conflictual relationships with their 
48 





54 We find Sofia Aboim’s idea of multireferential masculinities useful in understanding 
55 
56 this complex picture (Aboim, 2009). These men in Huambo had significant tensions to manage 
57 
58 
as they sought to build lives as respected senior men. These included the demands of the 
59 
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3 breadwinner ideal, which promises an authority that is always vulnerable to being overturned 
4 
5 
in straitened and unequal times; the competing demands for support from kin within and beyond 
7 
8 the household; and the tension between an older idea of masculinity based on seniority and 
9 
10 accumulated wisdom and an emerging masculinity based on the display of monetary wealth 
11 
12 
through commodities and extra-marital sexual relationships. Each of the object investments 
13 
14 
15 described above adopts different but overlapping approaches to managing these tensions. 
16 
17 This sometimes meant, as Aboim also found in Maputo, Mozambique, ambivalence and 
18 
19 normative conflict – masculinities were not always coherent constructions. For example, many 
20 
21 
men made an appeal both to some of the values associated with rural “Umbundu tradition” and 
23 
24 male eldership, and a desire to limit reciprocity and embrace modern urban living over rural 
25 
26 life – and this was true of both the companionately-married churchgoing men and the 
27 
28 
mulherengos. As Aboim also argues, there are pluralities in the concepts and practices of 
30 
31 modernity to which these masculine styles appeal. For churchgoing men, there was an appeal 
32 
33 to Christian moralities conceived of as modern and global; the mulherengos, on the other hand, 
34 
35 
also made global references in their masculine performances, but to a globalized consumer idea 
36 
37 
38 of the good life and the consumer style of the party-state elite. This drew on the example of 
39 
40 members of the party-state elite, and on the examples of lifestyles in Europe and North America. 
41 
42 However, contrary to some readings, neither Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, nor 
43 
44 
Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity depend on static or coherent models. Gramsci’s 
46 
47 vision of hegemony, rather, conceives of it as something that encompasses a “compromise 
48 
49 equilibrium” of different interests and tendencies (Gramsci, 2000 p.211), related to a common 
50 
51 
sense which is “fragmentary, incoherent” and constantly changing (Gramsci, 2000 p.343). In a 
53 
54 similar vein, Connell and Messerschmidt emphasize that a “degree of overlap or blurring” 
55 
56 between divergent masculinities is “extremely likely if hegemony is effective” (2005 p.839), 
57 
58 
and that the concept of hegemonic masculinity “is a means of grasping a certain dynamic within 
59 
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3 the social process” (p.841), rather than positing a static model. The moral contention we 
4 
5 
describe  between  overlapping  styles  of  masculinity  does  not,  therefore,  undermine  what 
7 
8 Demetriou terms its “external hegemony” (2000 p. 341), i.e., the hegemony of men over 
9 
10 women, even though the “internal hegemony” amongst competing styles of masculinity was 
11 
12 
more uncertain, at least at a local level. Around the core ethic of breadwinner masculinity, 
13 
14 
15 premised on the subordination of women, swirled a contest for prominence between 
16 
17 masculinities respectively premised on a more distant model of marriage, a companionate 
18 
19 model of marriage, and a more demonstrative mulherengo model that emphasized the display 
20 
21 
of monetary wealth. 
23 
24 A final point is that, as we suggested in the introduction, the changes brought on by the 
25 
26 civil war that most troubled these men were not directly related to either violence or 
27 
28 
militarization. Rather, the puzzle of how to adapt pre-existing gendered cultural forms and 
30 
31 practices to legacies of enforced urbanization, the way the war had allowed the rapid, 
32 
33 ostentatious accumulation of mineral wealth by a small elite in a context of a corrupt 
34 
35 
liberalization, and the changing relation of commodities to masculine respect, were of greater 
36 
37 
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